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Post-Rio Treaties: Implementation
Challenges
IRINA 0. KRASNOVA*
I. Introduction
The preparation of two international documents in 1994
marked an important step toward combatting the problem of
global ecological degradation. The Draft Agreement Relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Straddling Fish
Draft Agreement),' and the International Convention to
Combat Desertification (Desertification Convention)2 both
gained international approval while advancing practical solu-
tions to worldwide environmental concerns. The problems of
desertification and reduction of fish stocks threaten not only
national ecological and economic stability, but also jeopardize
stable regional and international development.
* Senior Lecturer in Environmental Law at the Moscow Juridical Insti-
tute. Presently, an LL.M candidate at the Pace University School of Law.
1. Draft Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, Aug. 23, 1994, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164122
(1994) [hereinafter Straddling Fish Draft Agreement].
2. Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Elaboration of an In-
ternational Convention to Combat Desertification; U.N. Convention to Combat
Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Deser-
tification, Particularly in Africa, U.N. Doc. A/AC.241/15/Rev. 7 (1994), reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. 1328 (1994) [hereinafter Desertification Convention].
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Desertification and reduction of fish stocks are two
problems which affect Russia gravely. The notorious deser-
tification of the Aral Sea and the less notorious but equally
devastating and uncontrolled harvesting of Russian marine
fish resources are just two examples of how the stark effects
of environmental degradation have affected Russia. The
Straddling Fish Draft Agreement and the Desertification
Convention have both attempted to address environmental
concerns. Analyzing the application of these two treaties
through the environmental and economic lens of Russia pro-
vides a useful case study for the worldwide significance of
these treaties. This paper first looks at the relevance of the
Desertification Convention and the Straddling Fish Draft
Agreement as applied in the Russian context. Second, the pa-
per briefly discusses the main innovations of each treaty.
Third, the paper critically analyzes the enforcement capabili-
ties of the treaties as applied to Russia. Last, the paper con-
siders the financial obligations and responsibilities of various
state categories under the treaties.
II. The Relevance of the Treaties to Russia
According to the Russian Federation's 1992 Annual Re-
port on the State of the Environment,3 at least two major
Russian regions of the country are officially recognized as be-
ing affected by desertification. These regions include:
Kalmykia in the Northern Caucasus of south European Rus-
sia and Buruatia in southeastern Siberia.4 Eighty per cent of
Kalmykia, once known for fertile farmland, now suffers from
mass desertification. Likewise, unchecked commercial forest-
cutting has caused intensive soil erosion in Buruatia, which
has resulted in accelerated wind and water erosion.5
3. State Report on the State of the Natural Environment in the Russian
Federation in 1992. Russian Federation Ministry of the Environment and Nat-
ural Resources, Moscow, 1993. Published in ZELENY Mm., Nos. 19-27, 1993.
4. See generally, THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 491, 802-03
(Robert Famighetti ed., 1994).
5. Douglas Stanglin, et al., Toxic Wasteland, 18 Moscow NEWS, Apr. 29,
1992, at 7.
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Perhaps the most vivid and sad example of the conse-
quences of global desertification is exemplified by the cata-
strophic demise of the Aral Sea.6 The Aral Sea was once the
fourth largest inland lake in the world, covering 64,000
square kilometers and holding nearly "1,000 cubic kilometers
of fresh water suitable to all human purposes."7 Previous to
its destruction, fishing, trapping and lumber industries
thrived due to the Aral Sea's wealth. Small vessels crossed
the Aral Sea, carrying sturgeon from the Aral waters, as well
as muskrat pelts and black saxaul wood from the Aral
banks.8 Yet, due to government irrigation demands for a
growing cotton industry, the two rivers feeding into the Aral,
the Syr Darya and the Amu Dayra, were mandated. Within a
short twenty-five years following the initial diversion, the fer-
tile environment of the Aral region was destroyed. The Sea
itself dwindled into two smaller lakes separated by a huge
desert chasm. Each of the smaller lakes is now filled with
shallow saline saturated water and dying fauna. The re-
maining part in between the two lakes has become an ex-
tremely salted desert, creating uncontrollable salt-saturated
wind storms. These storms whip through the Kazakhstan re-
gion causing contamination of agricultural plants in the far
regions of Siberia and rendering the life of the local people
unbearable.9
6. The depletion of the Aral Sea can be traced to a 1960s Soviet era plan
which "turned Uzbekistan into the world's third-largest cotton producer." The
plan diverted Central Asia's two main rivers, the Amu and Syr, which fed the
Aral, into a huge desert irrigation project. Steve LeVine, Aral Sea's Defenders
Suspend Fight To Save It: Local Groups Shift Efforts To River Deltas, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 9, 1994, at A31.
7. The Murder of the Aral Sea, 27 Moscow NEws, July 1, 1992, at 28.
8. Id. Annually, the Aral yielded up to 50,000 sturgeon and over 1,000,000
muskrat pelts. Id.
9. Some commentators believe that it will take from one dozen to several
dozen years to rehabilitate the Aral sea, even if urgent measures are taken for
artificially replenishing the sea immediately. It's Better to be a Pessimist, Than
an Optimist, 12 ZELENY Mm., 1993, at 14, 15. However, replenishing the Aral
Sea appears drastically expensive and practically difficult. Instead, this author
believes that present actions should concentrate on thwarting further depletion
of Aral waters. See, e.g., Inter-State Fund To Save the Aral, 20 ZELENY MIR.,
1993, at 2 (describing a conference between several Central Asian and Euro-
3
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Due to such drastic changes, the risk of natural global
emergencies and calamities has grown. The Aral Sea previ-
ously acted as a "fulcrum in the ecology and weather pat-
terns" in this area of the world. 10 Previously, the natural
evaporation process of nearly one meter of water annually
from the Aral Sea deflected cold currents of air into high alti-
tudes, where they drifted to the Pamir Mountains before con-
densing and replenishing the Pamir glaciers. Now, however,
these cold air currents rest in the Aral Sea region, dropping
temperatures to -17* Celsius.1 Scientists predict that with-
out continued replenishment of the Pamir glaciers from these
cold air currents, intense snow melting in the Pamir and Hi-
malayan Mountains could occur, thus stimulating global cli-
matic changes. 12
The state of marine fish resources in the coastal waters
of Russia arouses similar anxiety. Until the 1960s, Russia
was a country with an abundance of natural stocks of valua-
ble fish species. Salmon and sturgeon made up about 80% of
the total annual catch. Most of the catch came from inland
seas, especially the rich waters of the Caspian, the Azoz, the
Aral, and the large Balkhash Lake. However, due to pollu-
tion and over-harvesting of fish stocks in inland waters, fish
populations have been depleted or driven to extinction. 13 To
compensate for freshwater fishing losses, Russia has recently
concentrated efforts on marine fisheries, creating an expen-
sive and powerful marine fishing industry. As a result, the
anthropogenic pressure on the marine ecosystem has in-
creased. The situation continues to be aggravated by large-
pean states which seek to develop an assistance program for further combatting
deterioration of the Aral Sea).
10. Moscow NEWS, supra note 7, at 28.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Massive mining for oil, oil pollution and excessive fish poaching have
traditionally been the causes for the depletion of salmon; however, recently, ge-
ological gold mining has also become a major contributor to environmental de-
struction. Igor Maltsev, Gold Fish, 18 Moscow NEWS WEEKLY, Apr. 29, 1992, at
36. The Goltsovka River and the Kameshkovaya-Obeshchanaya River have
both suffered the effects of geological mining, the most drastic results occurring
in the Kameshkovaya-Obeshanaya River where now "no trace of salmon" is
found to exist. Id.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/5
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scale poaching, general neglect and unpenalized violations of
resource conservation legislation.
To a large extent, the problems of desertification and fish
stock depletion emerged as a result of long-standing Russian
economic policies. Desertification in Kalmykia was caused by
both overgrazing and a narrow orientation of the region on
cattle-breeding. 14 Likewise, intensive irrigation demands for
a growing cotton industry in the Aral region forced the diver-
sion of two crucial rivers which feed into the Aral Sea. 15 The
diversion of these rivers may be directly linked to the demise
of the Aral Sea itself.
Present Russian political and economic reforms continue
to create ecological destruction. Privatization and liberaliza-
tion of trade relations encourage over-utilization of natural
resources rather than managed care and sustainable yield.
While a reorientation of the Russian economy is a necessary
measure to deal with the problems of desertification and fish
stock depletion in the country, the economic crisis currently
in Russia prevents the reorientation of the economy. More-
over, although an ecologically sound investment policy could
be a long-range strategy to change the direction of un-
restricted exploitation of natural resources, the Russian in-
vestment policy could hardly be considered environmentally
concerned. Instead, investment priorities are given to devel-
opment projects in the Siberian and the Northern forests, and
oil production in the continental shelf. Thus, the danger of
creating further ecological problems remains.
In the face of such environmental degradation, the im-
portance of international agreements must be recognized.
Treaties can become an important defense against practices
that further promote ecologically unsound national policies.
The policies expounded in the Desertification Convention and
the Straddling Fish Draft Agreement may set the outer limits
14. Presently, 83% of the previously fertile pastures of Kalmykia are de-
graded. Upon scientific assessments, by the year 2030 the whole area will be-
come a dead desert that is considered as an ecological threat of a European
scale. See 19 ZELENY Mm., supra note 3, at 2.
15. The two crucial rivers which feed into the Aral Sea are the Syr Darya
and the Amu Darya. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
1995]
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to trends of ecological deterioration in Russia and
internationally.
III. The Main Innovations of the Treaties
Both the Straddling Fish Draft Agreement1 6 and the
Desertification Convention 17 contain rather strong. mecha-
nisms by which nations can limit degradation of their re-
sources. Although the two Agreements are both based on the
international law of cooperation for achievement of their pro-
claimed aims,18 the mechanisms by which these treaties
achieve their aims differ in significant ways.
The Straddling Fish Draft Agreement stems from the
principle of strict mutual control of the Parties over each
other's fishing practices.1 9 The Straddling Fish Draft Agree-
ment outlines unambiguous requirements for the Party
States by establishing definitive rights and duties of signa-
tory parties. Additionally, the treaty contains explicit liabil-
ity provisions. These provisions serve as a strong financial
incentive to individual nation-states by imposing a cost ratio
upon them if liability is found.20
Here the long-term aim to stop degradation of nature
could be attained through fair and rational distribution of
16. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, at 1.
17. Desertification Convention, supra note 2, at 1.
18. The Desertification Convention provides that the Parties should col-
laborate with each other to ensure the implementation of the Convention,
which in turn will promote an enabling international environment. Desertifica-
tion Convention, supra note 2, pt. III, art. 12. Similarly, the Straddling Fish
Draft Agreement requires all States to comply with reasonable requests in the
investigation of violations of the agreement. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement,
supra note 1, pt. V, art. 19(1). The agreement also compels Parties to cooperate
in identifying vessels suspected of violating its provisions and to make evidence
available to the appropriate prosecuting authorities. Straddling Fish Draft
Agreement, supra note 1, pt. V, art. 19(3), (4).
19. The Agreement authorizes a Party State to board and inspect a fishing
vessel that it suspects of impersonating another State. Straddling Fish Draft
Agreement, supra note 1, pt. V, art. 20(2). This authorization includes provi-
sions that allow the arrest and detention of the suspected impersonating ship.
Id.
20. For example, the Agreement authorizes a Party State to institute pro-
ceedings in accordance with international law where there is evidence that a
vessel has been fishing on the high seas without a nationality. Straddling Fish
Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. V, art. 20(3).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/5
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common natural wealth. Economic interest is a motivation
for collective actions to preserve the fish resources.21
By contrast, the Desertification Convention presents a
well balanced plan of measures to be taken by its Parties with
an assistance mechanism forming its basis.22 The Conven-
tion does not impose clearly defined obligations of the Parties,
and provisions for liability are acutely absent. The lack of
liability provisions in the Desertification Convention proba-
bly stems from the minor short-term economic effects coun-
tries experience due to desertification. Thus, without
economic incentives, the primary compelling factor to avoid
desertification is an understanding by all States of the danger
of the world-wide desertification.
Some authors believe that the degradation of nature may
be thwarted by distributing expenses and international
assistance to countries affected by desertification.23 National
policies could also be redirected to focus on environmental ar-
eas within a state's boundaries. Many African countries al-
ready plagued by the effects of desertification would benefit
by such an approach. 24 This redistribution policy would focus
economic and political concern for desertification on both an
international and national level.
21. Party States are required to ensure that conservation and management
measures are designed to maintain stocks at a level that will produce the maxi-
mum sustainable yield. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. II,
art. 5(b).
22. The Desertification Convention provides that developed countries are to
actively support the efforts of developing country Parties to combat desertifica-
tion and mitigate the effects of drought. Desertification Convention, supra note
2, pt. II, art. 6. In addition, the developed country Parties are to provide finan-
cial resources, as well as promote and facilitate access of the developing country
Parties to the appropriate technological knowledge. Id.
23. The Desertification Convention requires developed country Parties to
"provide substantial financial resources and other forms of support to assist af-
fected developing country Parties ... and the least developed countries, to com-
bat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought[.]" Desertification
Convention, supra note 2, pt. II, art. 6.
24. The Desertification Convention provides that priority should be given to
African country Parties in the implementation of the obligations of the devel-
oped country Parties. Desertification Convention, supra note 2, pt. II, art. 7.
See also Desertification Convention, supra note 2, Annex I.
1995]
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The strict mutual control method utilized by the Strad-
dling Fish Draft Agreement and the assistance mechanism
approach used by the Desertification Convention differ by vir-
tue of two international problems: the question of
demographics and the issue of jurisdiction.
IV. The Effectiveness of Implementation Schemes
Under the Treaties
The potential effectiveness of a treaty's means of imple-
mentation is an important question which naturally arises
upon its inception. Both the agreements concerning conser-
vation of fish stocks and desertification contain potentially ef-
fective implementation mechanisms.
The Straddling Fish Draft Agreement establishes the
duty of coastal States and those States fishing on the high
seas to cooperate in the adoption of conservation and man-
agement measures. 25 The Straddling Fish Draft Agreement
requires these coastal and fishing States to bring about such
conservation and management measures primarily through
the establishment of regional and sub-regional organizations
within their specific marine regions.26 The Straddling Fish
Draft Agreement grants the member States wide regulatory
and enforcement authority within these regions.27 The
Straddling Fish Draft Agreement empowers these regional or
sub-regional organizations to introduce conservation and
management measures for their particular straddling or
highly migratory fish stocks.28
Upon establishment of such regulated marine regions,
fishing States and coastal States are "to give effect to their
duty to cooperate by participating in the work" of the regional
organizations. 29 Membership in the regional fisheries' man-
agement organizations is open to all states having an interest
in the stocks regulated.30 More importantly, only the states
25. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. II, art. VIII.
26. Id.
27. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. III, art. VIII.
28. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. III, art. IX.
29. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. III, art. IX.
30. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. III, art. VIII.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/5
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which participate in such organizations will have access to
the fisheries within the regional organization's jurisdiction. 31
The Straddling Fish Draft Agreement empowers these
regional organizations to regulate the allocation of allowable
catch and to adopt recommended international minimum
standards regarding fishing techniques and fishing conduct.32
The Straddling Fish Draft Agreement also allows members of
regional organizations to vest inspection powers in the offi-
cials of a particular member State to arrest and detain ves-
sels violating the requirements.33
In addition, the Straddling Fish Draft Agreement grants
enforcement authority to port and flag states alike.34 Na-
tional legislatures of the member States under the Straddling
Fish Draft Agreement will adequately authorize their own of-
ficials to control and punish offending vessels sailing under
their flag.35 The member States may seek assistance in such
enforcement actions and in turn are expected to render
assistance in finding and investigating violations committed
by other vessels.36
The Straddling Fish Draft Agreement authorizes port
States to board and inspect vessels voluntarily entering their
ports.37 In cases of suspected violations, the Straddling Fish
Draft Agreement authorizes the port States to maintain con-
trol over a suspected vessel while the port State's authorities
inform the ship's respective flag State.38
Other important provisions within the Straddling Fish
Draft Agreement concern each member State's duty to collect
and exchange information, including scientific advice, techni-
cal and statistical data, and implementation reports.39 The
Straddling Fish Draft Agreement gives special attention to
31. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. 1I1, art. VIII.
32. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. II, art. VIII.
33. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. HI, art. I
34. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. HI, art. XIV.
35. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. II, art. XII.
36. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. 1I1, art XIX.
37. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. HI, art. XIV.
38. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. HII, art XVII.
39. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. HI, art. IX, X.
19951 105
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the interests of developing countries and coastal States de-
pendent on regulated fish stocks.40
While the Straddling Fish Draft Agreement's regulatory
measures provide the external control needed to guarantee
mutual compliance with each region's conservation and man-
agement requirements, the measures are also meant to en-
courage the region's member states to implement their own
similar conservation and management measures. 41 The
member States adoption of their own similar conservation
and management measures is an important prerequisite to
successful implementation of the Agreement.
The measures set out by these treaties are desperately
needed in Russia. For instance, the Straddling Fish Draft
Agreement requires states to establish and enforce efficient
punishment measures for violation of fish protection rules.42
The Criminal Code of Russia also punishes similar violations
by confiscation of property and a maximum prison sentence of
not more than four years.43 However, the punishment is
rarely applied and thus ineffective. Administrative penalties
and compensation remain the predominant forms of punish-
ment for violation of fishing rules. Yet, high inflation, high
food prices and the ensuing potential for high profits from
poached fish make these punishments practically useless as
deterrents. Thus, Russia must review its currently inade-
quate conservation and management measures and introduce
more effective ones.
Another problem is Russia's lack of institutional systems
to enforce more effective conservation and management
measures. In Russia, the only state entity responsible for the
regulation and enforcement of fishing rules is the economi-
cally oriented Committee for Fishing.44 Another administra-
40. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. V, art. XIX
41. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. III, art. VIII, IX.
42. Straddling Fish Draft Agreement, supra note 1, pt. HI, art. XIV-XVIII.
43. UK RSFSR, Art. 163 (1993).
44. SP SSSS, No. 208 (1993) (establishing the guidelines presented by the
federal Russian Federation Fishing Committee). The federal Russian Federa-
tion Fishing Committee is a federal agency responsible for regulation and inter-
agency coordination with respect to protection and rational use of fish and other
aquatic animals. Id. The Committee is responsible for issuing fishing permits,
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/5
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tive agency, the Ministry on Environmental Protection
(MEP), was organized in principle to control economic activi-
ties; however, due to administrative constraint, it unfortu-
nately cannot significantly influence general fishing
practices. The MEP is hampered by a lack of resources and a
weak position within the government's institutional system.
Furthermore, MEP environmental concerns hold a generally
low priority position within the government's developmental
hierarchy. 45 Consequently, even with the adoption of new
conservation and management measures by the international
community, the state of the environment in Russia will prob-
ably not improve without mandatory, radical institutional
change. The establishment of multilateral inspections within
the regional organizations with mandatory involvement of
the member State's environmental protection agencies could
be one way of ensuring that member States similar to Russia
implement the necessary conservation and management
measures. The treaties should include such protocols.
To ensure long-term conservation of marine fishing re-
sources, it seems necessary to improve technology in the fish-
ing industry and even to restructure the economy. This is a
difficult but attainable task. Presently, approximately one-
third of the total catch is lost in transportation, storage and
processing, and another substantial portion of the catch is
used for feeding fur-bearing animals. Reform measures
which rehabilitate inland fish stocks and which introduce ef-
ficient technologies and equipment to the fishing industry
should be considered. Even the reduction of fish resources as
the primary feed stock for the fur industry could ameliorate
inappropriate use of the catch. Such specific provisions
would be important additions to the Straddling Fish Draft
Agreement.
allocation of catch, regulation of fishing methods, inspection and policing of vio-
lators. Id.
45. SP SSSR, No. 375 (1994) (implementing regulations on the Ministry of
the Environment and Natural resources). The Ministry must fulfill two main
tasks: implement a unified national ecological policy and coordinate the envi-
ronmental and natural resources activities of all administrative entities at all
levels. Id. The Ministry is also empowered to arrange for and fulfill state eco-
logical control which is generally centered on fish resources protection. Id.
1995] 107
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The Desertification Convention also promises to be po-
tentially effective. It uses an integrated approach that recog-
nizes the worldwide desertification problem. The treaty
recognizes the close link between socio-economic factors such
as poverty, malnutrition, and technological deficiencies and
desertification. The Convention provides for a comprehensive
approach'to these problems.
The implementation mechanism is based upon the hon-
oring of two interconnected obligations of the treaties' par-
ties. The first is the obligation of the affected countries to
prepare national action programs. The second is the obliga-
tion of developed countries to provide substantial financial
and other assistance in the preparation and implementation
of these programs.46 The Desertification Convention provides
detailed outlines of national action programs that envisage
drought preparedness and management measures, 47 estab-
lishment of livelihood projects, 48 and development of sustain-
able irrigation programs. 49 These operational measures are
combined with long-term strategic actions to be taken by the
affected countries. These strategic actions include develop-
ment of preventive measures to protect lands not yet de-
graded,50  integration with sustainable development
policies, 51 and improvement in cooperation between the do-
nor community, governments at all levels, local populations
and community groups.52
V. Categories of States Under the Treaties
The Desertification Convention contains explicit provi-
sions concerning sources of support and assistance for appro-
priate national actions.53 In particular, it is envisaged to
undertake complicated scientific research programs aimed to
46. Desertification Convention, supra note 2, pt. II, art. 5.
47. Desertification Convention, supra note 2, pt. III, art. 10.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Desertification Convention, supra note 2, pt. III, art. 10.
52. Id.
53. Desertification Convention, supra note 2, pt. III, art. 9.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/5
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increase knowledge about processes that lead to desertifica-
tion, to promote transfer of technologies, and to conduct
training in efforts to combat desertification. 54 All of these ex-
pensive activities are to be financed from national and inter-
national sources of affected and developed countries.5 5 The
Desertification Convention calls for efforts to mobilize neces-
sary financial resources for these purposes.5 6
Although the Desertification Convention acknowledges
that desertification requires substantial resources, such fi-
nancial dependence, in my view, makes the Convention vul-
nerable. The refusal to make appropriations and
investments under many available favorable options may cre-
ate an absence of resources, putting enforcement measures of
the Convention at risk. In this case, the Convention could
share the destiny of other treaties, which have failed to fully
accomplish their role in protecting the environment. A possi-
ble solution could be to further specify and strengthen those
provisions which concern international economic and trade
relations. Perhaps joint protocols and multinational imple-
mentation agreements could be specifically fashioned to re-
duce the depletion of natural resources in affected countries.
Another factor could also lower the efficiency of interna-
tional efforts in this field. Throughout the text, the Parties to
the Desertification Convention are categorized. These cate-
gories include: developed countries, developing countries, af-
fected developing countries, simply affected countries, and
least developed countries. Yet, despite the many categories,
only two definitions are provided: that of affected countries 57
and that of developed countries. 58 Depending upon the cate-
54. Desertification Convention, supra note 2, pt. III, art. 17.
55. Desertification Convention, supra note 2, pt. II, art. 20.
56. Desertification Convention, supra note 2, pt. III, art. 20.
57. Affected countries are defined under the Convention as,"... countries
whose lands include, in whole or in part, affected areas." Desertification Con-
vention, supra note 2, pt. I, art. I(i). Affected areas are defined as, "... arid,
semi-arid and/or dry sub-humid areas affected or threatened by desertification."
Id., pt. I, art. I(h).
58. Developing countries are defined under the treaty as,"... developed
country Parties and regional economic integration organizations constituted by
developed countries." Desertification Convention, supra note 2, pt. I, art. I(k).
10919951
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gory, mutual rights, obligations, and actions to be taken could
be substantially different.
There are three major uncertainties in the Desertifica-
tion Convention relating to affected and developed countries.
First, under present definitions, it remains unclear which
category would best apply to countries such as Russia, which
are both affected and developed. Second, uncertainties exist
in deciding which country Parties would be primarily respon-
sible for providing support to other affected countries. Third,
the question remains which country Parties would concen-
trate on their own desertification problems, instead of provid-
ing support to other affected countries. These theoretical
uncertainties are underscored by vague and contradictory
provisions. For example, Article 9(2) provides for priority
support in preparing action programs to "affected developing
country Parties, particularly those in Africa",59 while Article
13 envisages that in providing support in elaboration and im-
plementation of action programs, priority shall be given not
only to affected developing countries in Africa, but least de-
veloped countries too.60
This uncertainty could reduce interest in implemen-
tation, and negatively influence efficiency of an urgent inter-
national program to resolve the problem of global
desertification. Moreover, there is no provision for re-catego-
rizing a nation, if its circumstances change.
VI. Conclusion
Implementation problems arise now in respect to many
international environmental treaties. The Straddling Fish
Draft Agreement and the Desertification Convention are no
different, and it is difficult to predict how these two treaties
will develop. The test will be whether states can use these
treaties to stop desertification of the earth's agricultural
lands and prevent man's annihilation of the earth's food sup-
ply of fish through overfishing and waste.
59. Desertification Convention, supra note 2, pt. III, art. 9.
60. Desertification Convention, supra note 2, pt. III, art. 13.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/5
